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REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:  THE 
CASE FOR TEACHING MORE AGENCY AND UNINCORPORATED 
BUSINESS ENTITY LAW 
MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
I have been teaching Business Associations since 1979, have co-authored 
two casebooks and a nutshell in the area,1 written numerous articles on various 
related topics,2 and devoted much of my professional career to teaching, 
studying, and writing about the law as it relates to business organizations. I am 
using this opportunity to urge greater coverage of agency law and the law of 
unincorporated business entities (partnerships and limited liability companies, 
referred to herein as UBEs) in course materials and in the classroom. 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY LAW 
A. Agency Outside the Business Associations Course 
Agency law receives short shrift in courses on business associations, if it 
receives any shrift at all. Typically, a casebook on business associations 
devotes less than one hundred pages to agency, and often far less.3 I would 
speculate that, in some courses, instructors skip the topic altogether. The 
typical casebook contains around one thousand pages, many with typefaces 
requiring magnification for comfortable reading. Something must be 
sacrificed. Why not agency, especially since there are so many sexy topics to 
be covered in corporate law (derivative actions, insider trading, and hostile 
 
* Monfort Professor of Commercial Law, University of Colorado Law School. The author thanks 
Eric Beamish, Class of 2016, for his research assistance. Copyright by Mark J. Loewenstein 2014 
All Rights Reserved. 
 1. See J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND THE 
LLC: THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (abr. 8th ed. 2011); DOUGLAS M. 
BRANSON, JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY, MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, MARC I. STEINBERG & 
MANNING GILBERT WARREN III, BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, 
AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 2012); J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. 
LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 2012). 
 2. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty: Mark J. Loewenstein, 
COLO. L., http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/profile.jsp?id=33 (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
 3. See infra Appendix. 
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takeovers, to name just a few)? But, these sexy topics, especially the latter two, 
arise rarely in the practice of the average business lawyer, and never in the 
practice of nonbusiness lawyers. By contrast, agency law is ubiquitous, arising 
in all areas of the law, in addition to being essential to an understanding of 
UBEs and corporate law. Indeed, at the University of Colorado, where I teach, 
we offer a separate course on agency, partnership, and the limited liability 
company.4 It carries three hours of credit, as does our Corporations course, 
which is a survey course on corporate and federal securities law.5 Agency, 
partnerships, and limited liability companies are not covered at all in our 
Corporations course. My sense is that more law schools are recognizing the 
importance of carving agency and UBE law out of a survey Business 
Associations course, and there are several books from which instructors may 
choose.6 
I will address the importance of covering UBE law below,7 but here I wish 
to emphasize agency law. Agency issues are ubiquitous in the law and 
sometimes overlooked by practicing lawyers. The recent case of United States 
v. Bonds,8 which I have added to the forthcoming edition of my casebook on 
agency and UBEs,9 provides a wonderful example of how agency issues have a 
way of arising in the most unusual places. The case involved our favorite 
baseball player to hold in contempt—Barry Bonds. I suspect that students will 
have an interest in the case because of his notoriety and will be surprised to see 
this criminal case leading off (so to speak) an exploration of agency law. 
Bonds was indicted for lying about his use of performance-enhancing drugs 
(PEDs)—he claimed he never knowingly used them.10 Part of the 
government’s case required it to prove that, in fact, blood and urine samples 
from Bonds had proved positive for PEDs.11 The government had evidence 
that did establish that connection:  statements made by Bonds’ sometimes 
trainer and friend, Greg Anderson, to James Valente.12 Valente worked for 
BALCO Laboratories, Inc., and, on multiple occasions, Anderson gave Valente 
 
 4. Course Descriptions, COLO. L., http://lawweb.colorado.edu/courses/courses.jsp (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2014). 
 5. Id. 
 6. E.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY, 
PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS (6th ed. 2012); HYNES & LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 1; WILLIAM A. 
KLEIN ET AL., AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES: UNINCORPORATED 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 2012); Larry E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, 
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES (4th ed. 2009). 
 7. Infra Part II.A. 
 8. United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 9. J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND THE LLC: 
THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (9th ed. forthcoming 2015). 
 10. Bonds, 608 F.3d at 497. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 498. 
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blood and urine samples, telling Valente that these samples came from 
Bonds.13 The records that BALCO kept did not identify the samples as coming 
from Bonds by name. Instead, a code was used to keep track of the samples.14 
The government sought to introduce Anderson’s statements to Valente to 
prove that the coded samples came from Bonds.15 Anderson, however, refused 
to testify and was ultimately held in contempt of court for his refusal.16 Valente 
was willing to testify as to what Anderson told him, but the defense objected 
that Valente’s testimony would be inadmissible hearsay.17 In response to the 
hearsay objection, the government argued that Anderson was Bonds’ agent and 
Anderson’s statements that the blood and urine samples came from Bonds 
were made by him in the course of his agency relationship.18 If, in fact (and 
law), Anderson was Bonds’ agent, then the government could prove that the 
coded samples came from Bonds. So the issue was clearly joined—was 
Anderson an agent for Bonds? 
The Ninth Circuit opinion is a pedagogical gem. The majority, in an 
opinion authored by Judge Mary Schroeder, marched through the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency elements of the definition of an agent and reached the 
conclusion that Anderson was not an agent for Bonds.19 Using the same facts, 
dissenting Judge Carlos Bea reached a contrary conclusion.20 It is not 
necessary to deconstruct these two opinions in this Essay; suffice it to say that, 
together, these opinions demonstrate the importance of the issue and that, on 
the margin, applying the definition of agency can be challenging. 
As the Bonds case so nicely illustrates, finding that a person is an agent of 
another can have profound effects on the outcome of a case. An agent’s 
statements or admissions (as alleged in the Bonds case), if made in the course 
of the agency relationship, are imputed to the principal;21 an agent’s tortious 
conduct (even, in some instances, intentionally tortious conduct) can result in 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Bonds, 608 F.3d at 498. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 500. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 495, 504–05; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
 20. Bonds, 608 F.3d at 508–09 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 286 (1958) (“In an action between the principal 
and a third person, statements of an agent to a third person are admissible in evidence against the 
principal to prove the truth of facts asserted in them as though made by the principal, if the agent 
was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to make, on the principal’s behalf, any 
statements concerning the subject matter.”). E.g., Big-D Signature Corp. v. Sterrett Props., LLC, 
288 P.3d 72, 79 (Wyo. 2012) (providing that an admission made by an attorney can be binding on 
client and constitute the basis for a verdict); Alan, Sean and Koule, Inc. v. SV/CORSTA V, 286 
F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1374 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (noting that statements of a ship’s captain binds the 
owners). 
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liability to the principal;22 notice to an agent can constitute notice to the 
principal;23 and an agent’s promises on behalf of the principal can bind the 
principal.24 In each of these areas, there are complexities and nuances, and for 
that reason, devoting class time to them is time well spent. Few survey courses 
on business associations have the time to do so. 
This same analysis—or, really, argument—could be made in several other 
areas of agency law. I will, however, consider only one other, which I include 
because of its inherent interest and growing importance as a focus of litigation: 
the adverse interest exception to the imputation doctrine.25 Just articulating the 
topic is likely to deter its consideration, because I would guess that most 
academics, including, unfortunately, teachers of Business Associations, are 
unfamiliar with it. The concept is simple: an agent’s actions and knowledge 
gained during the course of an agency relationship are imputed to the principal, 
unless the agent is acting adverse to the interests of the principal.26 The cases 
are fairly clear that acting adverse to the principal means that the agent was 
acting solely in the agent’s interest, without any intent to further the interests 
 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (“An employer is subject to liability for torts 
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”). See also Ira S. 
Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 169–70, 172 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that a 
principal is liable for intentionally tortious conduct of agent). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.02(1) (“A notification given to an agent is 
effective as notice to the principal if the agent has actual or apparent authority to receive the 
notification, unless the person who gives the notification knows or has reason to know that the 
agent is acting adversely to the principal as stated in § 5.04.”). 
 24. Id. § 6.01(1) (“When an agent acting with actual or apparent authority makes a contract 
on behalf of a disclosed principal, (1) the principal and the third party are parties to the 
contract . . . .”). 
 25. Id. § 5.04. Section 5.04 provides the following: 
For purposes of determining a principal’s legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact 
that an agent knows or has reason to know is not imputed to the principal if the agent acts 
adversely to the principal in a transaction or matter, intending to act solely for the agent’s 
own purposes or those of another person. Nevertheless, notice is imputed (a) when 
necessary to protect the rights of a third party who dealt with the principal in good faith; 
or (b) when the principal has ratified or knowingly retained a benefit from the agent’s 
action. A third party who deals with a principal through an agent, knowing or having 
reason to know that the agent acts adversely to the principal, does not deal in good faith 
for this purpose. 
Id. 
 26. Id. § 5.03. Section 5.03 provides the following: 
For purposes of determining a principal’s legal relations with a third party, notice of a fact 
that an agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to the principal if knowledge of the 
fact is material to the agent’s duties to the principal, unless the agent (a) acts adversely to 
the principal as stated in § 5.04, or (b) is subject to a duty to another not to disclose the 
fact to the principal. 
Id. 
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of the principal.27 This principle of agency law arises frequently in cases 
involving corporate misconduct; that is, rogue corporate officers cook the 
corporate books, with the result that shareholders, lenders, and others suffer 
losses when the truth is revealed.28 The ensuing litigation frequently involves 
claims by the corporation (which, presumably, has purged the bad actors) 
against the accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers (its “professional 
service providers”).29 The plaintiff argues that the negligence of these 
professionals allowed the scheme to succeed. Often, that assertion is factually 
accurate but legally insufficient. Rather, agency law is at the center of the 
litigation and often is outcome determinative. The agency law question is 
whether the rogue actors were acting solely in their own interests or, instead, 
were the corporation’s interests somehow being advanced?30 In most cases, the 
plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that no interest of the corporation was being 
served. Typically, the scheme allowed the corporation to raise equity, incur 
indebtedness, attract talent, or make acquisitions at favorable prices. If true, the 
actions of the rogue officers are imputed to the corporation (or its trustee in 
bankruptcy) and the defendant professional service provider can raise the in 
pari delicto defense. The corporation, they assert, is itself the bad actor and 
cannot sue another wrongdoer.31 This defense is a winner.32 
In addition to its importance to criminal law and tort law, as described 
above, an understanding of agency law is essential for a deep understanding of 
the law of UBEs and corporate law. The next section, hopefully, makes that 
case. 
A. Agency Law as a Basis for UBE and Corporate Law 
1. Questions of Authority 
Among the topics covered in a Business Associations course are the power 
of partners to bind a partnership; the power of officers, directors, and corporate 
employees to bind the corporation; the fiduciary duties of these various actors 
 
 27.  Id.§ 5.04 cmt. c. 
 28. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Imputation, the Adverse Interest Exception, and the Curious 
Case of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 305, 308 (2013) (noting the 
consequences that follow revelations of truth). 
 29. See id. at 308 n.8 (providing citations to exemplary cases). 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04. 
 31. Loewenstein, supra note 28, at 309 (explaining the concept). 
 32. See id. at 308 n.10 (providing further explanation of the concept and a collection of 
cases). There is an exception to the adverse interest exception that applies when a rogue agent is 
the only person who can act for the principal—the so-called “sole actor exception.” It is beyond 
the scope of this Essay to explore the nuances of this doctrine, but that exploration really brings 
one into the wonderful complexities of agency law. See id. at 326 (discussing the sole actor 
exception). 
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to the entities they serve; and whether these duties can be modified or 
eliminated by contract. These issues are also among the bread and butter issues 
covered in agency law, and, I believe, learning the relevant doctrines as part of 
agency law course facilitates an understanding in the context of a partnership 
or corporate issue. Why is it, for instance, that an officer of a corporation can 
or cannot bind the corporation to a contract? When is approval of the board of 
directors required and when it is not? Studying only corporate law cases does 
not give the student the deeper understanding that arises when that student has 
the benefit of a course on agency law. In agency law, we study express 
authority, implied authority, apparent authority, inherent agency authority, and 
estoppel, all of which are relevant to resolving questions regarding the 
authority of partners, LLC members and managers, and corporate officers. 
These concepts give the student (and legal practitioner) the necessary tools to 
approach a question of authority. 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
Regarding fiduciary duties, at some point, the student will confront Judge 
Cardozo’s famous quote from Meinhard v. Salmon: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at 
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held 
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of 
behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and 
inveterate.33 
But, this quote has much more meaning if one understands the context in 
which it appears, and that context is partnership law. In this case, the court 
concluded that joint venturers were fiduciaries of one another and fiduciary 
duty precluded one of the venturers (to the exclusion of his co-venturer) from 
securing a renewal and extension of a lease held by the venture.34 Exploring 
this case and the issues it raises—what was the basis for finding a fiduciary 
duty and why did it apply to the particular actions of the defendant—go to the 
very core of the law of fiduciary duties. I love the case because the answer to 
why the court recognized a fiduciary duty does not really emerge from the 
quote above, but rather from fundamental concepts of contract law. A duty 
would be implied because the parties implicitly understood that it would. But, 
did they here? What evidence suggests that they did or did not? With a good 
understanding of Meinhard and other fiduciary duty cases covered in an 
Agency Law course, a student is well-equipped to understand why corporate 
officers cannot seize corporate opportunities or compete with the corporation. 
 
 33. 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928). 
 34. Id. at 548, 550. 
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Finally, consider one important and current issue in corporate law on 
fiduciary duties: should the corporation be able to limit or eliminate fiduciary 
duties of directors in its articles of incorporation? This question became an 
urgent one after the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of a Delaware 
corporation could be held liable for money damages because they were grossly 
negligent in approving a corporate merger.35 (Actually, that had long been the 
rule in Delaware, and in a few cases directors had been held liable. But, none 
of the cases had the notoriety of the case then before the court.36) The decision 
prompted an immediate reaction from the Delaware legislature, undoubtedly 
prompted by the influential corporate bar of Delaware, to amend the Delaware 
general corporation law to permit corporations to exculpate directors from the 
duty of care by including an appropriate provision in its certificate of 
incorporation.37 Most other states quickly followed suit.38 But, this exculpation 
covered only the duty of care. How about the duty of loyalty? Whether the 
statute should be further amended to cover the duty of loyalty involves, in part, 
an understanding of the origins of the duty. If Judge Cardozo’s dictum is taken 
literally, the answer is likely no, because the duty arises from fundamental 
moral principles, and unless those principles have changed in the years since 
Meinhard was decided (1928), there is no reason to change the legal 
principle.39 But if, as I believe, the basis is contractual, then perhaps a different 
result is called for. The law of UBEs is a rich laboratory for exploring the 
contractual freedom to modify fiduciary duties and, when the issue is 
considered in corporate law, will provide essential precedent. This is one of the 
justifications for a thorough exploration of the law of UBEs, the subject of the 
next section. 
 
 35. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881, 893 (Del. 1985). 
 36. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the 
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099–1100 (1968) 
(finding only four cases over several decades in which directors of a nonfinancial corporation 
were held liable for damages). 
 37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986). 
 38. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2008); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do 
Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2000) (“Exculpatory charter provisions 
adopted pursuant to statutes, almost universally enacted since Van Gorkom, have rendered the 
damages claim for breach of the duty of care essentially non-existent.”). 
 39. See Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
139, 141–42 (2012) (discussing morals legislation and arguing its failure to serve the goals of a 
“pluralistic, federalist society”). 
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II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF UBE LAW 
A. Teaching the Law of UBEs 
Business Association casebooks and, therefore, Business Associations 
classes “underteach” the law related to UBEs. Roughly 75% of new businesses 
are limited liability companies (LLCs),40 yet casebooks devote less than 25% 
of their pages to examining LLCs and often less than 10%, with partnerships 
receiving even less attention.41 Even in Delaware, a state that to many is 
synonymous with the word corporation, there were 112,982 new domestic 
LLCs formed in 2007, as opposed to 34,144 new domestic corporations, a ratio 
of 3.3 to 1.42 One reason that LLCs may be underrepresented in casebooks is 
that there are relatively fewer casebook-worthy LLC cases than corporate 
cases. Corporations have been around and generating interesting litigation for 
over one hundred years, while the first LLC statute appeared in Wyoming in 
1977, and a significant number of appellate decisions have begun to appear 
only in the last ten years or so.43 But LLC statutes draw heavily on partnership 
statutes, particularly the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), which was 
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws in 1997.44 To the extent that a provision in a LLC statute is based on a 
comparable RUPA provision, precedent interpreting the RUPA provision is 
directly relevant to the LLC provision. 
This correspondence is one reason to teach partnership law, but hardly the 
only reason or the most important reason. Partnership law has also had an 
important impact on the development of corporate law. To take one prominent 
example, consider the corporate law doctrine of shareholder oppression. Under 
this doctrine, if those in control of a closely held corporation have used their 
control to “oppress” minority shareholders, the minority may be able to obtain 
judicial relief.45 Oppression in this context is generally interpreted to mean 
conduct that disappoints the reasonable expectations of the minority 
 
 40. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the 
Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–2007 
and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460, 
460 n.2 (2010) (providing statistics of the number of LLCs formed). 
 41. See infra Appendix. 
 42.  Chrisman, supra note 40, at 460 n.4. 
 43. Over the past decade or so, treatises on LLC law have begun to appear. For an example 
of a treatise on LLCs, see LARRY E. RIBSTEIN AND ROBERT B. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND 
KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (2d ed. 2004). 
 44. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997). 
 45. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, JOAN M. HEMINWAY, MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, MARC I. 
STEINBERG, MANNING G. WARREN III, BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, 
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 439–50 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing shareholder oppression and closely 
held corporations). 
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shareholders.46 This widely accepted doctrine is based on the presumption that 
a closely held corporation is really an incorporated partnership, by which the 
courts mean that the shareholders considered themselves to be partners of one 
another and only chose the corporate form because it afforded them limited 
liability.47 Since they considered themselves partners, partnership fiduciary 
duties ought to be implied into the relationship. At this point, an understanding 
of partnership becomes very helpful. One insight is that the duties that courts 
imply into a closely held corporation are not always found in partnership law. 
For instance, the seminal case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New 
England, Inc.48 involved a claim by the widow of a former shareholder/partner 
that if those in control redeemed the shares of one of their own, she too was 
entitled to have her shares redeemed at the same price.49 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court agreed, opining that shareholders in a close 
corporation, like partners in a partnership, owe one another the “utmost good 
faith and loyalty.”50 Such grand pronouncements are hardly helpful in 
resolving whether the failure to redeem the plaintiff’s shares violated a 
fiduciary duty, and the court cited no partnership cases where the issue arose. 
In short, in this and subsequent cases, the Massachusetts court developed a 
body of law distinct from partnership law.51 It is an interesting and worthwhile 
exercise to explore how various cases in this line of precedent would come out 
applying partnership law and understanding partnership law provides the 
advocate with a tool to litigate an oppression case. 
One other observation is worth noting and considering: should the law of 
shareholder oppression apply to LLCs? After all, LLCs are creatures of 
contract, not statute, and if the parties do not contract for the fiduciary duties of 
partners, why should a court imply them? I am not referring here to the duties 
that those in control owe to the entity, to act in its best interests, but rather to 
the imposition of a duty to act in the personal interest of other members in the 
same way that those in control of Donahue Electrotype had to consider what 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 
1975) (“Commentators and courts have noted that the close corporation is often little more than 
an ‘incorporated’ or ‘chartered’ partnership.” (citation omitted)). 
 48. Id. at 505. 
 49. Id. at 510–11 (“She urges that the distribution constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty 
owed by the Rodds, as controlling stockholders, to her, a minority stockholder in the enterprise, 
because the Rodds failed to accord her an equal opportunity to sell her shares to the 
corporation.”). 
 50. Id. at 515 (citation omitted). 
 51. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: A Historical 
Perspective, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 339, 361, 364–65 (2011) (describing judicial developments 
since 1975). 
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Mrs. Rodd’s interests and expectations were.52 A good argument can be made 
that the shareholder oppression doctrine arose from a unique set of 
circumstances—those forming a closely held corporation would have preferred 
a partnership, but could not choose that form because of the liability 
constraints. With the advent of limited liability companies and limited liability 
partnerships, where participants enjoy limited liability, those unique 
circumstances no longer exist. 
A handful of cases have considered this issue and have generally carried 
over the shareholder oppression doctrine to limited liability companies with no 
consideration as to whether the policy justifications for the doctrine applied 
with equal force to LLCs.53 In my opinion, they do not, and I expect to see a 
court at least grapple with the issue. Students should be aware of it, as this is a 
frequently litigated issue. 
In addition to providing an important foundation for understanding the 
shareholder oppression doctrine, the study of UBE law is essential for 
understanding the growing and important jurisprudence relating to freedom of 
contract and disclaiming of fiduciary duties. Limited liability companies have 
become the preferred form of business organization in part because the 
enabling statutes privilege freedom of contract, to a greater or lesser extent.54 
The former characterizes Delaware law, which expressly provides in its LLC 
statute (and partnership statutes) that the policy of the statue is “to give the 
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”55 Another provision of 
Delaware law permits the operating agreement for a limited liability company 
(and the partnership agreement for partnerships) to eliminate fiduciary duties.56 
However, Delaware law also provides that the operating or partnership 
agreement “may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.”57 The combination of these provisions has led to an 
interesting evolution in LLC operating and partnership agreements, as lawyers 
draft to the edge of the permissible (and sometimes beyond). The agreements 
 
 52. E.g., Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 817, 822 (2009) (those in control of an LLC 
could not defeat the expectations of a co-member). 
 53. J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY PARTNERSHIP AND THE LLC: 
THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 
586–97 (8th ed. 2011). 
 54. See Myron Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware 
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221–22 (2009) (noting 
that the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act provides the “ultimate contractual 
customization”). 
 55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2011). See also tit. 6 §§ 15-103(d), 17-1101. 
 56. tit. 6, §§ 15-103(f), 17-1101(f), 18-1101(c). 
 57. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e). See also tit. 6 §§ 15-103(b)(3), 17-1101(d). 
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are often tested in the Delaware courts, where feedback from the judicial 
decisions informs the next generation of agreements. 
What we are witnessing is the evolution of a form of operating or 
partnership agreement that limits the duties of those in control and avoids the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At issue in the litigation is 
typically a related party transaction between the LLC or partnership and 
another entity in which those in control have an interest.58 If the LLC or 
partnership had been a corporation, the courts would impose on those in 
control the burden of proving that the transaction was fair to the corporation.59 
But, LLC and partnership law looks to contract—the operating or partnership 
agreement—to set out relevant approval process. Increasingly (according to the 
case law developing in Delaware) that approval process requires the approval 
of a “special committee,” which may or may not be independent of those in 
control.60 Clearly, such a process would not pass muster under corporate law, 
at least if the committee lacked independence.61 
If the transaction in question appears to be unfair to the minority partners 
or minority members of the LLC, they have few strategies to attack the 
transactions. Because fiduciary duties are disclaimed in the agreement, the 
claimants must argue that those in control somehow breached the agreement, 
either because they failed to follow the procedures set out in the relevant 
agreement or they violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The latter is the claim that is most often litigated, and the courts must parse the 
agreement to determine whether there is an implied covenant that may have 
been breached, thus providing a basis for relief.62 Delaware precedent suggests 
that a covenant will not be implied unless it would provide an obligation that 
the parties did not include in the agreement but would have included had the 
matter been brought to their attention.63 Courts motivated to do justice are 
motivated to find an implied covenant; lawyers representing promoters of 
limited liability companies and partnerships are motivated to craft their 
agreements to preclude such a finding. As a result, a fascinating jurisprudence 
is developing. 
 
 58. E.g., Allen v. Encore Energy Partners, L.P., 72 A.3d 93, 95–96 (Del. 2013) (describing 
an acquisition); Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 67 A.3d 369, 370 (Del. 2013) 
(describing a joint venture agreement); Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 356 
(Del. 2013) (describing a merger). 
 59. Allen, 72 A.3d at 109 (“If Allen seeks the protections the common law duties of loyalty 
and care provide, he would be well-advised to invest in a Delaware corporation”). 
 60. The Gerber case, infra note 73, is a typical example of cases involving “special 
approval.” 
 61. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra note 58. 
 63. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126 (Del. 2010). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
652 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:641 
In Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P.,64 which is typical of these cases, 
the Delaware Supreme Court considered a carefully drawn limited partnership 
agreement (LPA) in the context of a challenge to an acquisition of the 
partnership.65 The plaintiff (Norton), a limited partner, complained about the 
way the consideration in the deal ($329 million) was divided between the 
general partner and the limited partners.66 The record suggested that the 
general partner’s interest may have been worth as little as $100,000, yet it 
received $18 million in the deal.67 The LPA required, among other things, that 
the general partner approve such a transaction and, in doing so, act in good 
faith.68 Under the LPA, the general partner acts in “good faith” if it reasonably 
believes that its action is in the best interest of, or at least not inconsistent with 
the best interests of, the partnership.69 In accordance with a provision of the 
agreement, a committee of the board of directors of the partnership obtained an 
opinion from an investment banker that the proposed deal was fair to the 
limited partners, but the opinion expressly did not consider the fairness of the 
consideration paid to the general partner.70 The general partner relied on this 
fairness opinion in recommending the deal to the limited partners, and the 
court concluded that the general partner was “therefore conclusively presumed 
to have acted in good faith” when it approved the deal and submitted it to the 
limited partners for their approval.71 The court concluded its opinion with this 
observation: 
Norton [the plaintiff] willingly invested in a limited partnership that provided 
fewer protections to limited partners than those provided under corporate 
fiduciary duty principles. He is bound by his investment decision. Here, the 
LPA did not require [the general partner] to consider separately the . . . fairness 
[of the amount of consideration paid to it], but granted [the general partner] 
broad discretion to approve a merger, so long as it exercised that discretion in 
“good faith.” Reliance on [the investment banker’s] opinion satisfied this 
standard. By opining that the consideration Kirby [the acquirer] paid to the 
unaffiliated unitholders [limited partners] was fair, [the investment banker’s] 
opinion addressed the . . . fairness [of the payment to the general partner], 
albeit indirectly. Kirby presumably was willing to pay a fixed amount for the 
entire Partnership. If [the general partner] diverted too much value to itself, at 
 
 64. 67 A.3d 354 (Del. 2013). 
 65. Id. at 367. 
 66. Id. at 357–59. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 364. 
 69. Norton, 67 A.3d at 361, 367. 
 70. Id. at 367–68, 367 n.61. 
 71. Id. at 368. 
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some point the consideration paid to the unaffiliated unitholders would no 
longer be “fair.”72 
The concept of good faith discussed in Norton was further refined in Gerber v. 
Enter. Prods. Holdings, LLC.73 The Delaware Supreme Court similarly faced a 
fact pattern in which the general partner apparently complied with the terms of 
the limited partnership agreement in a related party transaction, but the 
transaction seemed, on its face, to be unfair to the limited partners.74 The 
limited partner challenging the transaction prevailed, in part because the court 
distinguished between the general partner’s contractual fiduciary duty of good 
faith (which, like the provision in Norton, was clearly set out in the agreement) 
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (which, of course, 
cannot be disclaimed).75 In the course of its lengthy opinion, the court 
identified and delineated various concepts of good faith: the fiduciary duty of 
good faith (which may be limited by contract, as it was in Norton) and the 
concept of good faith that arises from the implied covenant.76 Understanding 
these concepts is useful in the of study corporate law, where, increasingly, they 
arise as well.77 
In Gerber, the court ultimately concluded that the general partner did 
satisfy the contractual fiduciary duty of good faith, but that the plaintiff 
successfully pled a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.78 In short, a committee of the general partnership had approved the 
transaction relying on an allegedly flawed opinion of an investment banker, a 
procedure that a limited partner could not have anticipated and, therefore, a 
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
CONCLUSION 
The casebooks on business associations are rich with materials covering an 
incredibly broad range of topics. That is one of the great challenges of teaching 
the course. An instructor using a book exceeding a thousand pages in length, 
and having limited time to cover those pages, faces hard choices. I have used 
this opportunity to make the case that agency and UBEs ought not to be on the 
chopping block and, in fact, merit considerable coverage in the course 
materials and in the classroom.  
 
 72. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 73. 67 A.3d 400 (Del. 2013) (overruled on other grounds in Winshall v. Viacom Int’l. Inc., 
76 A.3d 808 (Del. 2013)). 
 74. See id. at 421–22 (reciting allegations of the complaint). 
 75. Id. at 418–21. 
 76. Id. at 418–19. 
 77. E.g., Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1126–77 (Del. 2010) (discussing the implied 
covenant). 
 78. Gerber, 67 A.3d at 423–25. 
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APPENDIX 
Page Distribution for Selected Casebooks on Business Associations 
  
 
 
Total 
Pages 
 
 
 
Agency 
Pages 
 
UBE 
(Unincorporated 
Business 
Entities) Pages 
 
 
Corporations, 
Securities & 
other Pages 
 
 
Agency 
% of 
total79 
 
 
 
UBE % 
of total 
 
Corp. 
and other 
% of 
total 
1 684 26 46 612 4 7 90 
2 940 50 115 775 5 12 82 
3 844 34 98 712 4 12 84 
4 1186 207 136 843 17 11 71 
5 1026 21 89 916 2 9 89 
6 634 20 115 499 3 18 79 
7 1296 22 286 988 2 22 76 
8 684 68 118 498 10 17 73 
9 1494 17 89 1388 1 6 93 
10 893 79 229 585 9 26 66 
11 1162 29 160 973 3 14 84 
12 474 15 31 428 3 7 90 
13 1012 53 76 883 5 8 87 
14 686 42 126 518 6 18 76 
Median 917 32 115 744 4 12 83 
1. WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 2012). 
2. DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL 
STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY (2d ed. 2012). 
 
 79. All fractions rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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3. ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS 
ENTITIES (2d ed. 2010). 
4. ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 
1987). 
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10th ed. 2010). 
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13. LINDA O. SMIDDY & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS 
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